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Abstract 
The vertical integration decision poses strategic 
challenges for a firm’s marketing channels’ 
decision prerogatives which drive its business 
strategy. This paper explicates those putative 
benefits of vertical integration as organizational 
strategy adopted by firms for alleviating 
respective transaction costs and optimizing 
functional governances of the business system in 
the enterprise. The discourse concentrates on the 
dynamics of the varied vertical integration 
mechanisms like joint ventures, mergers, and 
contracting agreements practiced by firms to 
serve as risk reduction strategies in the business 
exchange process.    
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Vertical integration has been an important 
research topic in organization studies, widely 
dealt with by academicians and practitioners. 
Whether or not to vertically integrate poses a 
strategic decision for a firm from marketing 
channels’ prerogatives which drive its business 
strategy (Stern and El-Ansary, 1988); as these 
initiatives can, from viewpoints of industrial 
economics and business exchange, have 
pronounced as well as long-term orientations and 
implications for the enterprise. The basis for 
vertical integration stems from a strongly held 
belief that transactions outside the firm (meaning 
those in the market) cost far greater than those 
within the firm. The basic notion of transaction 
cost economics is that the properties of a 
transaction determine what constitute the 
efficient governance structure (market, 
hierarchy, or alliance) (Reve, 1990). In vertically 
integrated firms, functions which were 
previously being outsourced would tend to be 
brought in-house. This means that the firm now 
has to undertake the responsibility of performing 
all its upstream and downstream processes in 
equally efficient a manner as it was being 
previously done, as the long term perspective is 
on information accuracy, cost saving, and 
organizational control. The premise of this 
research paper is based on how the firm can 
bring the desired business functions, processes, 
and facets of control within its confines by 
utilizing joint ventures, mergers, and/or 
contracting agreements as potential vertical 
integration strategies. These will be the focus 
areas of explanation in this paper as the vertical 
integration mechanisms which can be adopted by 
firms for alleviating respective connected 
transaction costs and optimizing functional 
governances of the business system in the 
enterprise. This paper concentrates on those 
putative benefits of vertical integration as 
organizational strategy for risk reduction, along 
with the dynamics of its varied mechanisms like 
joint ventures, mergers, and contracting 
agreements which serve as risk reduction tools in 
the business exchange process. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW, WITH 
PERTINENT THEORY AND DISCOURSE 
 
This main section of the paper encompasses 
vertical integration aspects as dealt with in 
background literature streams, with connected 
discourse embedded in the fabric of the 
explanations and descriptions. 
 
A. Vertical Integration as Organizational 
Strategy 
 
Vertical integration manifests business chain 
internalization activities as the substitution of 
internal organization for market exchange, 
wherein the reason attributed to is mainly the 
transactional failure of the market in operations 
for intermediate goods, and also to the 
transaction costs which arise when using the 
market mechanism (Williamson, 1971). The 
implication is that institutional form and internal 
organization matter when it comes to strategy 
(Reve, 1990). Transaction costs arise from four 
main transactional difficulties: bounded 
rationality (cognitive and perceptual limitations 
on the part of the actors), opportunism (self-
interest seeking with guile), small numbers 
bargaining (e.g., oligopoly conditions), and 
information impactedness (asymmetrical 
distribution of information among the exchange 
parties) (Williamson, 1981). These transactional 
difficulties and associated costs increase when 
transactions are characterized by: asset 
specificity (transactions requiring investments 
which are specific to the requirements of a 
particular exchange relationship), uncertainty 
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 (ambiguity as to transaction definition and 
performance), infrequency (transactions which 
are seldom undertaken) (Williamson, 1981). 
Under competitive conditions organizations will 
seek governance structures that economize on 
transaction costs. Hence, hierarchy (the firm) 
will prevail when asset specificity and 
uncertainty are high (Reidel, Lewis and Pawar, 
1992). This leads the firm to adopt vertical 
integration whereby many of these transaction 
costs can be greatly attenuated. The advantage of 
integration lie not in that technological (flow 
process) economies are unavailable to 
nonintegrated firms, but that integration 
reconciles differences, harmonizes mutual 
interests and paves for decision processes to be 
utilized. The advantages of internalization reside 
in the facts that the firm’s ex post access to the 
relevant data is superior, it attenuates the 
incentives to exploit uncertainty 
opportunistically, and the control machinery that 
the firm is able to activate is more selective. In a 
production scenario, if there is a high degree of 
interdependence among successive stages of 
production, and if occasions for adaptation are 
unpredictable yet common, coordinated 
responses may be difficult to secure if the 
separate stages are operated independently. With 
vertical integration, a firm can rid itself of 
internal sub-parts’ taxes, quotas, tariffs, etc. It 
enjoys structural advantages like free availability 
and exchange of information, and better inter-
personal interactions for smoother 
communication in complex matters. The 
incentives and interests to work toward a 
common goal free employees of opportunistic 
behavior. Besides, the firm is able to have tighter 
control over its intra-firm activities, and possess 
better conflict resolution abilities, along with its 
own reward and reprimand policies.  
 
Vertical integration provides more systematic 
coordination between and better control of 
respective upstream and downstream functions. 
There is timely exchange of information 
regarding intermediate goods, raw materials, 
components and work-in-process inventory 
(Norton and Sashi, 2004). Increased coordination 
from better communication (Arrow, 1975; Perry 
1984) and supply assurances (Carlton, 1979; 
Buzzell, 1983; Green, 1986) constitute elements 
of organized factor endowments positively 
driving firm strategy and structure (Porter, 
1990), thereby posing vital benefits of vertical 
integration. With timely information regarding 
costs and supply patterns disseminating through 
the business chain, a vertically integrated 
enterprise is better able to process the price 
information and employ an optimal mix of inputs 
(Norton and Sashi, 2004). If firms do not possess 
superior bargaining power for controlling costs 
so as to drive profitable returns from revenue and 
information over other members in their channel, 
they are better off vertically integrating 
(Harrigan, 1983). If market conditions are not 
stable, and risk of outsourcing is high, firms 
prefer to bring those functions in-house. Besides 
cost, nature of the functions performed, and 
quantity of production is also to be considered 
when engaging in vertical integration (Stigler, 
1951). As industries mature, costs for suppliers 
increase; hence it suits better to absorb activities 
in-house, and vertically integrate. Vertical 
integration optimizes the capital and knowledge 
necessary to conduct operations within the firm, 
rather than rely on externalities in channels on 
supply and demand side. Vertical Integration 
creates value in that it is essentially a way of 
acquiring predictive information regarding 
upstream and downstream process activities 
(Arrow, 1975). It provides the firm with 
information flows to facilitate supply of raw 
materials, procurement relationships, outputs and 
pricing structures, sales planning and demand 
forecasting, proper processes and operations 
planning, and work/resources allocations.  
 
However, the decision on how to integrate 
business units is often complicated and each 
form of business organization from wholly owed 
subsidiaries to joint ventures has its own 
associated costs and risks. The potential 
transaction failures identified in the streams of 
business literature typically relate to transactions 
involving procurement, joint production, or 
distribution. As such, the transactions are 
properly characterized as vertical linkages of a 
central manufacturing firm (Butler and 
Baysinger, 1983). The most obvious strategy or 
governance structure for reducing the 
transactions costs of these market-mediated 
linkages, i.e., reducing the probability of 
transaction failures, is vertical ownership 
integration of the various separable stages in the 
procurement-production-distribution chain. This 
integration converts suppliers and customers, 
whose relationship had been market-mediated, 
into divisions of the organization.  These 
previously separate levels of production are now 
controlled through administrative command of 
the common owner (Butler and Baysinger, 
1983). As the extent of a firm’s vertical 
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 integration increases, through ownership, the 
firm’s reliance on market-mediated exchange 
decreases, and the transaction costs associated 
with using the market correspondingly decrease.  
Opportunism between divisions, for example, 
will be irrational because an organization cannot 
logically exploit itself (Butler and Baysinger, 
1983).   
 
The notion that two firms may become vertically 
integrated while continuing to exist as legally 
separate and autonomous entities is a significant 
departure from traditional notions of vertical 
integration. Yet, under the transaction-cost 
approach, all intermediate strategies that 
suppress the market price mechanism can be 
viewed as a form of vertical integration (Butler 
and Baysinger, 1983). Industrial organization 
economists have come to recognize the generic 
nature of intermediate vertical strategies and 
outright vertical ownership, whereby vertical 
economies can often be achieved by long-term 
contracts, adjacent location, or other devices 
between separate companies, as well as by 
formal ownership and functional integration 
(Butler and Baysinger, 1983). The most basic 
way to reduce these costs is to avoid using 
markets by vertically integrating through 
ownership. These vertical-integration cost 
savings, however, are not without cost.  As 
vertical ownership integration increases, the firm 
incurs a number of diseconomies associated with 
a large-scale, complex organization. Self-
interested employees and even entire divisions 
may pursue goals which are not necessarily 
consistent with the maximization of the firm’s 
profits. The major drawback of this market-
suppressing solution is that it may lead to a net 
increase in costs due to increased administrative 
costs. Therefore, a firm can choose intermediate 
exchange strategies like contracting agreements, 
mergers, and joint ventures which minimize the 
sum of transaction and bureaucratic costs, while 
optimizing on control dynamics of the enterprise. 
 
B. Strategy of Contracting Agreements for 
Vertical Integration 
 
Reducing transactional costs can be achieved 
through contract management wherein economic 
literature has postulated the idea of the firm 
operating as a nexus of contracts (Dimatteo and 
Larry, 2010).  Thereby the internalities and 
externalities of the business environment pose 
the multitude of complex relationships (i.e., 
contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) 
and the owners of labor, material and capital 
inputs and the consumers of output. To this 
accord, a significant advantage of relational 
contracting as compared to the classical and 
neoclassical modes of contracting is that it not 
only provides for the sharing of risks but also a 
possible reduction of risk (Butler and Baysinger, 
1983). This reduction is possible because the 
long-term nature of relational contracts reduces 
the incentives of economic agents to engage in 
the types of opportunistic behavior that lead, in 
market-mediated discrete transactions, to 
transaction failures.  In this regard, it is 
important to note that relational contracting 
involves not only inter-firm but also intra-firm 
relationships. This serves to emphasize the point 
that relational notions supersede the simple 
market-firm dichotomy that is the basis of the 
classical and neoclassical systems. Thus, a 
relational contract system attempts to save 
contractual relationships that are in trouble by 
going beyond the four corners of the original 
contract and looking to the overall context of the 
whole relationship (Butler and Baysinger, 1983). 
When the marginal cost of overseeing a contract 
with a third party exceeds the cost of firms 
producing something in-house, integration will 
result. As a practical matter, however, parties do 
enter relational contracts. While economic 
organization is a tool for economizing on 
transaction costs, the creation of internal 
organization through the establishment of firms 
entails other transaction costs (McInerney, 
2004). As per the basic industrial economics 
postulation for ‘nature of the firm’, performing 
some activities within a firm might reduce the 
transaction costs of using external market pricing 
mechanisms (Coase, 1937). Forming an 
agreement costs money and represents a 
significant reoccurring transaction cost; 
negotiating and drafting detailed contracts entails 
expenses when the parties need to include 
clauses that govern arcane contingencies (Geis, 
2007). A potential benefit of centralized firm 
control is the reduction of price discovery, 
negotiation, and contracting costs arising under 
market transactions. Moving economic activity 
into a firm can help reduce some transaction 
costs by replacing them with ex post governance 
mechanisms (Geis, 2007). Instead of bothering to 
write a detailed contract, a firm maintains 
enough discretion over the activity to make the 
optimal decision later - if and when a future 
uncertainty emerges (Geis, 2007). Thus, 
depending on the exact nature of the economic 
activity, and the likely complexity of transaction 
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 costs, a firm will choose between markets and 
firm ‘hierarchies’ to secure the input. A problem 
in contracting away risk is the ability to 
ameliorate agency costs. An agency relationship 
arises as a contract between two or more persons 
under which one person (the principal) engages 
another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on his or her behalf, which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to 
the agent (McInerney, 2004). The problem of 
opportunism or agency costs arises from the fact 
that when a principal contracts with an agent to 
perform a certain service, the principal lacks the 
ability to monitor the agent fully to oversee 
performance of that service. Because of 
principals’ inability to monitor agents’ behavior 
fully or draft contracts specific enough to bind 
agents to perform in a particular manner, 
principal-agent theory seeks to identify tools to 
reduce the costs of such dilemma (McInerney, 
2004).  
 
C. Strategy of Organizational Mergers for 
Vertical Integration 
 
Structuring the transaction as a merger or an 
acquisition can propagate ways of reducing 
transactional and agency risk when acquiring the 
business or its functions externally and 
incorporating those within the confines of a new 
firm. Some of these productive methods include 
mergers where the subsidiary is fully controlled 
by the parent, mergers where the parents’ 
corporation owns a majority of the subsidiary, 
mergers where the subsidiary is entirely 
eliminated, and mergers where all the assets of 
the target are purchased by the parent. When 
eliminating the existence of the subsidiary, with 
its full merger into the parent firm, this method 
has the desired affect of eliminating the need to 
contracting deal with the subsidiary, its 
shareholders, and its board of directors as an 
ongoing separate entity. In this manner it reduces 
the ongoing agency costs of competing interest 
and opportunism. In addition on going 
transaction costs associated with up keep of 
records and legal costs for the subsidiaries board 
of directors and shareholders are eliminated. The 
major advantage of structuring the firm into a 
wholly owned subsidiary is to take managerial 
control of the employees, equipment and quality 
control mechanisms, while building 
collaborative relationship which should reduce 
intra-firm opportunism costs. In situations where 
there is at least ninety percent ownership of the 
subsidiary there is little need to worry about 
minority shareholders blocking the parent’s 
corporate plans as they can simply be eliminated 
in a short form merger without the consent of the 
targets Board of Directors or shareholders 
(Cheeseman, 2012). A vertically integrated 
merger can occur where the parent has majority 
ownership of the subsidiary but there also is a 
substantial minority stockholder percentage. This 
situation can create agency and transactional 
costs for the vertically integrated firm because 
the minority shareholders can interrupt the 
corporate planning of the parent firm. Many 
courts have held that the majority shareholders 
owe a fiduciary responsibility to the minority 
shareholders; for instance, Coggins versus New 
England Patriots Football Club, Inc,  406 Mass. 
666, 550 N.E.2d 141, 1990. This essentially 
means that the parent corporation would need the 
minority shareholders’ approval in many 
situations. If the parent corporation wanted to 
merge into another corporation, or substantially 
change its business model in a transaction that 
would require either the Board of Director or 
Shareholder approval. A vertically integrated 
merger can occur where, rather than acquire the 
target corporation as an ongoing enterprise the 
assets that are needed are simply purchased. 
While this eliminates the transaction costs 
associated with the ongoing maintenance of the 
subsidiary’s records and the agency costs 
associated with maintaining the relationship with 
the subsidiary, it also has the large drawback of 
not providing the technical skill and knowledge 
of the employees. A firm would usually pursue 
this form of organization when they already have 
the technical skill within their current confines to 
produce the service or product. One can 
separately hire or contract with the target 
corporations employees. However, unless such 
skill is located within a selected group of 
employees it is unlikely that the corporation will 
see any reduction in transaction costs. 
 
D. Strategy of Joint Ventures for Vertical 
Integration 
 
Reducing risk through joint ventures is another 
powerful mechanism for vertically integrating 
firms. The typical make-or-buy decision has 
been analyzed from the standpoint of transaction 
costs, industrial organization economics, and 
flexibility (Salbu and Brahm, 1992). However, 
the ‘make-or-buy’ dichotomy is sometimes 
inadequate to differentially examine production 
decisions along the value chain.  The option to 
enter joint ventures that serve either to supply 
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 raw materials or to purchase them is a hybrid 
option. Supply options include contract 
arrangements with separate entities for 
manufacturing or assembly, contract 
arrangements with a subsidiary or joint venture, 
licensing agreements, and functional absorption. 
The joint venture option to that effect is a hybrid, 
or middle-ground choice, because it operates as a 
compromise in terms of the flexibility versus 
coordination. A joint venture is an arrangement 
in which two or more business entities combine 
their resources to pursue a single project or 
transaction (Cheeseman, 2012). Unless otherwise 
agreed, both firms involved in the joint venture 
have equal rights to manage the joint venture 
(Cheeseman, 2012). This maintains the level of 
opportunism and agency costs associated with 
other types of outsourcing. However, the joint 
venture has the benefit of sharing capital assets. 
As the coherent goal-seeking working 
relationships progress with symbiotic initiatives 
for sharing of risks and rewards, such synergy 
often manifests into forms of strategic alliances 
between the involved partnerships in the venture. 
Each joint venture is also protected legal from 
opportunism and agency costs by the legal 
protections of the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
care. The duty of loyalty results in severe legal 
sanctions against the perpetrator of opportunism 
by punishing such opportunism as self dealing, 
usurping a business opportunity, and wasting 
corporate assets (Salbu and Brahm, 1992). The 
joint venture can be set up as a partnership; in 
such form of organization the joint ventures are 
share holders of the joint venture corporation. In 
a joint venture partnership each joint venture is 
liable for the debts and obligations of the other 
joint venture, through drafting and enforcement 
of agreements which discourage free riding, 
thereby minimizing the risk of opportunism 
related costs (Salbu and Brahm, 1992). 
Contracting with a joint venture is more of a 
commitment than contracting with an outside 
entity. It enhances control over the joint venture 
supplier while potentially reducing strategic 
flexibility over the option to select an alternative 
source of supply.  Joint ventures are often used 
to organize upstream productive activities in 
order to bypass inefficient markets for 
intermediate inputs (Salbu and Brahm, 1992). 
This explanation of joint venture activity has two 
components. The first restates arguments 
supporting advantages of hierarchy over markets 
under certain identifiable types of failures in 
markets for intermediate goods (Salbu and 
Brahm, 1992). The second and equally important 
part of the argument explains why a shared 
equity joint venture, rather than sole ownership 
through vertical integration, is the appropriate 
response to market failure, in that shared equity 
will be preferred when the scale economies of 
production at a downstream stage are 
significantly different from the scale economies 
of production at the immediately adjacent 
upstream stage.  When a downstream producer 
cannot fully utilize the higher capacity of scale-
efficient operations at the previous stage, the 
producer will prefer to share ownership with 
another buyer of the intermediate goods (Salbu 
and Brahm, 1992).  
A vertical joint venture is best used to provide its 
parents with preferential access to its outputs 
while restraining the pricing of those outputs to 
rates below the external market. In effect, the 
partners can attempt to subsidize their own 
products’ price competition with an artificial 
advantage that non-integrated competitors would 
be unable to tap (Salbu and Brahm, 1992). To 
utilize this stratagem the joint venture's 
dependence upon external sources for its 
investment capital must be low, since the 
venture’s low profits will not attract capital at 
favorable rates. Parents can usually address this 
problem by supplying the venture's capital from 
their own resources (Salbu and Brahm, 1992). 
Another risk of joint ventures is the acquitting of 
trade secrets or technology by the joint venture 
partner. Joint venture participants can take 
several steps, both contractual and extra-
contractual, to mitigate the risk of a partner's 
appropriation of technological capabilities (Salbu 
and Brahm, 1992). Extra-contractual precautions 
include careful partner selection including 
scrutiny of potential partners’ collaborative 
history as well as their probable incentives for 
appropriation regardless of stated intentions or 
objectives, restriction of access especially to 
interdependent technological capabilities within 
the parent organization about which a partner 
may seek to learn, and implementation of 
appropriate human resource tactics designed to 
help ensure satisfactory progress in the evolution 
of the collaboration (Salbu and Brahm, 1992).  
 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
Vertical Integration as an organizational strategy 
itself, although practiced as the major route to 
alleviate transactions costs in the business 
exchange process, is clearly not free of its own 
inherent and projected costs and risks. The 
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 market-mitigating mechanism of vertical 
integration manifested via the renowned 
strategies like joint ventures, mergers, and 
contracting agreements practiced by firms, as 
explained in detail within this research paper, 
poses its own forms of risks and costs as well. 
This paper’s discourse has attempted to 
compound the varied integration elements into a 
cohesive initiative propagating the putative 
benefits of these strategies. Future research 
endeavor in this light will work toward drawing 
out the risk-inducing and cost-resulting 
components of each of these vertical integration 
strategies, in an attempt to develop a 
comprehensive nature of costs-benefits type 
framework, along with posited conjectures to 
point toward firms’ criteria for optimizing their 
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